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BOOK REVIEWS
HIGHS AND LOWS
The Royal Navy in the Age of Austerity, 1919–22: Naval and Foreign Policy under Lloyd George, by  
G� H� Bennett� London: Bloomsbury, 2016� 296 pages� $120 (paperback $39�95, e-book $28�76)�
Royal Navy captain Stephen Roskill’s 
1968 study Naval Policy between 
the Wars (Naval Institute Press) has 
dominated the historiographical scene 
on this subject for half a century� G� H� 
Bennett’s volume now successfully adds 
much depth and new understanding 
to the naval policies of Prime Minister 
David Lloyd George’s government in the 
immediate aftermath of the First World 
War� Bennett’s volume follows, but with 
a much different focus, Erik Goldstein 
and John Maurer’s The Washington 
Conference 1921–22 (Routledge, 1994)  
and Donald Lisio’s British Naval 
Supremacy and Anglo-American 
Antagonisms, 1914–1930 (Cambridge 
Univ� Press, 2014)� Rather than fol-
lowing the traditional approach to this 
period of concentrating on international 
diplomacy and external issues, Bennett 
demonstrates “a multifaceted approach 
rooted in political and naval history 
but opening up new and cutting-edge 
debates in other areas of historical study 
to transform traditional debates” (p� xiv)� 
Laudably, Bennett seeks an approach 
to naval history that breaks down the 
artificial barriers that place the study of 
navies in a watertight compartment and 
isolate it from “total history” and the 
broader patterns of relevant linkages in 
political, military, economic, business, 
social, gender, and labor history�
The works of Volker Berghahn, Jon 
Sumida, and Samuel P� Huntington 
have had an impact on Bennett’s focus� 
Significantly, Bennett’s approach reflects 
the parallels he sees in the 1919–22 
period with the issues surrounding 
British naval policies in the second 
decade of the twenty-first century�
In opening his sensitive and innovative 
study of this three-year period, Bennett 
points out that Lloyd George’s govern-
ment had a particularly tricky range of 
problems to balance after World War I� 
While other recent historians have inter-
preted the period as one of discontinuity 
in British naval and defense policies, 
Bennett sees continuity� The inability of 
the government to “get it right” in the 
area of naval policy was a direct result 
of the size and complexity of the issues 
that it faced� The difficulty lay in the 
interconnectedness of naval policy with 
government politics, the private sector, 
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and communities� As Samuel Hunting-
ton would have put it, British naval 
policy had been in a state of “disequilib-
rium” even before the beginning of the 
First World War, and this continued into 
the postwar period� Britain’s economy 
was declining in comparison with 
other national economies; changing 
technology and weapons were render-
ing obsolete Britain’s investment in its 
battleship fleet; and other countries, 
notably Japan and the United States, had 
the potential to build navies that would 
end British naval mastery� British leaders 
correctly saw these developments as 
significant threats to the security, stabil-
ity, and future of the British Empire�
In the immediate postwar era, Britain 
faced massive war debts, along with a 
range of severe social and political issues 
complicated by unemployment, labor 
unrest, and the rise of socialism� These 
issues combined to create challenges 
to the existing social, economic, and 
political order� In trying to create naval 
policies in this complex environment, 
the Lloyd George government made its 
national security decisions on the basis 
of what it might be able to afford rather 
than on preparing for the worst-case 
scenario� That worst-case situation, of 
course, was the war that would occur 
twenty years later, but that neither the 
government nor the British voter could 
contemplate so soon after the horrific 
events of World War I� Ministers were 
forced to balance naval preparedness for 
a future war against national bankruptcy 
and the fears of a socialist victory by 
election or revolution� In this situation, 
Lloyd George placed his ministry’s 
priority solely on the financial con-
sideration and the reduction of public 
spending rather than on a considered 
analysis of the strategic situation and 
the likelihood of war� The ministry’s 
institution in 1919 of the “ten-year rule” 
in defense planning effectively excluded 
the possibility of thinking about war�
As Bennett points out, this was in one 
sense a logical and pragmatic approach, 
but it forced the Royal Navy and the 
other armed services to find alternative 
explanations for keeping the service 
in a state of preparedness to deal with 
the future security of Britain and the 
empire� While the service turned to 
effective arguments such as showing that 
battleship construction helped reduce 
unemployment, Bennett argues that 
this undermined a clear understanding 
of the purpose and value of the navy, 
harming it in the long run� He goes 
on to argue that the ten-year rule had 
a pernicious and long-term effect by 
establishing the precedent that leaders 
could make competent defense decisions 
without an assessment of strategic needs 
and threats� Bennett underscores the 
lesson from this period that political 
imperatives cannot compromise stra-
tegic threat assessments and decisions� 
“Dangers must be identified and noted, 
even if the means to meet them are not 
immediately at hand” (pp� 179–80)�
Bennett’s book is a significant con-
tribution to naval history� Not only 
does it provide a new interpretation 
of historical events, but it does so by 
placing the navy in a much broader 
context� While other scholars may 
argue points of interpretation, his 
vision in bringing about a broader 
understanding of the naval dimensions 
of this period is a model for others to 
follow and apply� Equally important, 
his volume has much to say to current 
practitioners and strategic planners�
JOHN B� HATTENDORF
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